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THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO ADDRESS
OR DECIDE APPELLANT ARGUMENTS AS TO THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 30-2-4 AS
INTERPRETED
Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an
unconstitutional elimination of a valid
recognized common law right in violation
of Article 1 Section 11 and Article 1
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution
1.

The loss of consortium in the years
pre-1898 was a valid recognized
common law right in Utah
,

2.

Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah
State Constitution must be read as
imposing limitations on legislative
power for the benefit of those
persons who are injured in their
persons, property or reputations. . ,

3.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an
unconstitutional elimination of the
common law right to a claim for loss
of consortium as it violates Article
1, Section 11 of the Utah State
Constitution
,
Section 32-2-4 as interpreted
does not satisfy Article 1,
Section 11 because by the
elimination of a common law
right it did not provide to the
injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy by
due course of law for vindication of that right
Section 30-2-4 does not satisfy
Article 1, Section 11 because
there is not a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated
and the elimination of the
existing legal remedy (loss of
consortium) is an arbitrary and

2

unreasonable means for achieving
the objective
B.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 24
of the Utah State Constitution because it
treats persons similarly situated
unequally
1.

Article 1, Section 24 pleaces
significant limitations on the power
of the legislature to enact laws. .

2.

Section 30-2-4 fails to meet equal
protection standards because it
treats persons equally situated
differently and the classifications
established do not provide a
reasonable basis for promoting the
objectives of the statute • . . . .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court's decision filed June 9, 1987 dealt strictly
with the history of the common law right of a husband to consortium and Appellant's argument that the language of Section 30-2-4
is ambiguous; that it had been erroneously construed or interpreted in earlier decisions and the interpretation did not follow
basic statutory construction principles.
However, the central thrust of Appellant's argument that
the previous interpretations of Section 30-2-4- were incorrect and
that the statute was and is unconstitutional was not addressed nor
determined by the Court's opinion.
Appellant urges the Court to reconsider its decision and
in particular to make a determination of the important constitutional issues in light of three specific unanimous decisions by
the Court in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah, 1984), Johnston
v. Stoker, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah, 1984) and Berry v. Beech Aircraft,
717 P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985).
Appellant hopes that each member of the Court will consider the long range problems of not limiting legislature's power
to modify common law rights and realize it is the Court, not the
legislature, who should and must adapt, recognize, refine and
maintain the common law.

Since a claim for the loss of consortium

has always been a common law right and it has only been limited
here by Court interpretations, it is up to the Court to recognize
that the loss of consortium is part of the common law today.
Appellant is not asking the Court to expand the common law but to
recognize that today the common law of Utah and the United States

includes the loss of consortium, the protection of the sanctity of
the marital relationship for both husband and wife.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO ADDRESS
OR DECIDE APPELLANT ARGUMENTS AS TO THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 30-2-4 AS
INTERPRETED.

When this court chose to follow the past interpretation
given to the language of Section 30-2-4 it did not address the
constitutionality of the elimination of valid a recognized common
law right to loss of consortium or the inequality it creates under
these interpretations, which both violate provisions of the Utah
State Constitution.
A.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an unconstitu-

tional elimination of a valid recognized common law right in violation of Article 1 Section 11 and Article 1 Section 7 of the
Utah State Constitution,
1.

The loss of consortium in the years pre-1898

was a valid recognized common law right in Utah.
The husband's right to recover for the loss of consortium which he suffered when his wife was injured was universally
recognized.

Restatement, Torts, Section 693: "Husband's Right to

Damages for Loss of Consortium," 21 ALR 1519, supplemented 133
ALR 1157.
This Court, in Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp 470
(D. Utah, 1967), Ellis v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d. 986 (Utah, 1972),
Tjas v. Procter, 591 P.2d 986 (Utah, 1978) and the written opinion in this case, filed June 9, 1987, has consistantly held that

in the years pre-1898 the right to loss of consortium existed in
Utah.
2.

Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitu-

tion must be read as imposing limitations on legislative power for
the benefit of those persons who are injured in their persons, pro
perty or reputations.
One of the constitutional restraints on a legislature's
power to totally eliminate a common law right is found in Article
1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution which reads in pertinent part, as follows:
All Courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this important
legislative restraint for many years.

In the case of Brown v.

Wightman, 151 P. 366 (Utah, 1915), the Court commented on Article
1, Section 11 by stating:
The Courts have, however, always considered and treated these provisions not as
creating new rights or as giving new remedies,
where none otherwise are given, but as placing a
limitation upon the legislature to prevent that
branch of the state government from closing the
doors of the courts against any person who has a
legal right which is enforceable in accordance
with some known remedy. (151 P at 366-7)
See also Lewis v. Merchants Protective Association, 235 P 880, 884
(Utah, 1925), Horn v. Shaffer, 235 P 555, 558 (Utah, 1915) and
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah, 1980).
The recent leading opinion involving Article 1, Section
11 was decided by this Court unanimously (4-0) in December 1985,

in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah, 1985).

In

that case, the Court, after careful analysis determined that:
It is, in fact, one of the most important
functions of the legislature to change and
modify the law that governs relations between
individuals as society evolves and conditions
require. However, once a cause of action under
a particular rule of law accrues to a person by
virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's
interest in the cause of action and the law
which is the basis for a legal action becomes
vested, and a legislative repeal of the law
cannot constitutionally divest the injured person of the right to litigate the cause of action
to a judgment. (717 P.2d at 676)
The Court held that since Article 1, Section 11 was a
substantial limitation on the legislature's power and since the
Product Liability Statute of Limitations did not meet the requirements of that constitutional provision, the statute was unconstitutional.
Many other states have used similar constitutional provision to strike down their guest statutes, statutes of repose in
Product Liability field and other attempts by legislatures to
abolish common law rights.

See Point II A. of Appellant's Origi-

nal Brief.
3.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is an uncon-

stitutional elimination of the common law right to a claim for
loss of consortium as it violates Article 1, Section 11 of the
Utah State Constitution.
In Berry, Supra the Court held that:
... Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights
and the prerogative of the legislature are
properly accomodated by applying a two-part
analysis. (717 P.2d at 609)

We will set forth the facts of this case in reference to that twopart analysis.
a.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted does not

satisfy Article lf Section 11 because by the elimination of common
law right it did not provide to the injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy by due course of law for vindication
of that right.
In this case it is clear that the legislative intent
behind the passing of the Married Woman's Act was to remove the
restrictions placed on married women/ known as coverture, thus
allowing a married woman to sue, to contract, and own property.
By interpretation the Court has determined that Section
30-2-4 also removed the right of a husband to sue for the loss of
consortium when his wife was injured.
However, Section 30-2-4 does not even attempt to establish any alternative to the taking away of this common law right.
Thus, Section 30-2-4 must fail the first of the two part
test in that it does not even attempt to set up any effective
alternative remedy.
If the Act took away the husband's right to sue for his
wife's own injuries and gave her the right, thus taking away of a
common law right would be acceptable because it substitutes the
right of a married woman to sue for her own injuries herself.
Please refer to Part I of Appellant's Reply Brief.
b.

Section 30-2-4 does not satisfy Arti-

cle 1, Section 11 because there is not a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of the existing legal

remedy (loss of corsortium) is an arbitrary and unreasonable means
for achieving the objective.
The purpose of Married Women's Act was to remove the
legal disabilities of coverture and to allow married women to have
the same legal rights to sue, contract and own property as married
man and singles. This is a very noble purpose which was widely
recognized at that time.
However, the elimination of an existing legal right of a
husband to sue for loss of consortium was not necessary to achieving the purpose of the statute.

The purpose of the Act was to

enable a married woman to bring her own suits, not to remove a
common law right from her husband to loss of consortium.
Thus the removal from the husband of the right to loss of
consortium is an illogical arbitrary means for achieving the
purpose of the statute.
B.

Section 30-2-4 as interpreted is unconstitutional

under Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution because
it treats persons similarly situated unequally.
1.

Article 1, Section 24 places significant limitations

on the power of the legislature to enact laws.
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution reads in
pertinent part, as follows:
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
It is clear that said section and the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
place additional restrictions on governmental exercise of authority in passing legislation.

This Court in the recent case of Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661 (Utah, 1984) stated in the unanimous (4-0) opinion concerning
these restrictions:
Basic principles of equal protection of
the law are inherent in the very concept of
justice and are a necessary attribute of a just
society. (693 P.2d at 670)
The Court in Malan, Supra, also stated concerning Article
1, Section 24 and the 14th Amendment:
Although their language is dissimilar,
these provisions embody the same general principle: persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly, and persons in different
circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same. (693 P.2d at 669)
Justice Robert Jackson in Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
v. New York , 336 U.S. 106 at 112-113 explained:
This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and
we should not forget today, that there is no
more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally . . .
If the precept of equal protection of the
laws is not honored, arbitrariness and oppression will prevail. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just that to
require that its laws be equal in protection.
2.

Section 30-2-4 fails to meet equal protection

standards because it treats persons equally situated differently
and the classifications established do not provide a reasonable
basis for promoting the objectives of the statute.
The language of Section 30-2-4 as interpreted creates
inequality in the law for pesons similarly situated.
There are at least five ways that a third parties1 con-

duct can so totally injure the sanctity of the marital relationship that the other spouse loses all love, society, companionship,
advice, counsel and conjugal fellowship of ones marital partner.
These are listed below:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

intentionally causing the death of one's spouse
negligently causing the death of one's spouse
intentionally allienating the affection of a spouse
intentionally causing a debilitating injury to
one's spouse
negligently causing a debilitating injury to one's
spouse.

In each of these examples the person can lose the total
love, affection and conjugal interests of their injured spouse.
Each feels the loss just as horribly as the other. While the
person whose spouse is dead may recover compensation, the person
whose spouse has lived after a negligently caused debilitating
injury allowing no real companionship, love or society cannot
recover.
How can the law say to Sherrie Hackford, whose role
instead of wife and companion has turned to babysitter and lifelong nurse to care for Greg that she cannot recover, when her
neighbor whose husband's life after a negligently caused injury
was taken instantly can recover for that loss, which is perhaps
not as great a loss as Sherrie's?
How can the law say to Mrs. X that because a burglar who
shot and totally disabled her husband, while he attempted a rescue, she cannot recover anything, even though the act was intentional, when her neighbor, Mrs. Y, can be compensated when a
teenage boy missed a stop sign and killed Mr. Y.

Should the law,

if it is to treat these persons similarly situated, allow compensation equally to all for their loss?

However# by virtue of the Courts present interpretation
of Utah Statutes and law, the plaintiff, in examples 1, 2 and 3
could bring a cause of action against the person intentionally or
negligently causing the spouse's death, injury or alienation.
Surely the marital interest of the injured wife in examples 4 and
5 has been hurt and damaged just the same as those in examples 1,
2 and 3, if not worse.
Additionally, the classifications established by Section
30-2-4 do not meet any rational basis test in meeting the objectives of the statute. The objective of the Married Woman's Act to
remove the disabilities of coverture had no relation to the unconstitutional distinctions which would remove the husband's right to
compensation for negligently created loss of consortium of a
living wife, yet allowing such claims in examples 1, 2 and 3
above.
II. THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
SINCE THE RIGHT TO LOSS OF CONSORTIUM IS A COMMON LAW RIGHT, THE
COURT, NOT THE LEGISLATURE, MUST DETERMINE ITS AVAILABILITY AND
SCOPE.
To contend that we should leave the decision as to whether Utah recognizes the loss of consortium to the legislature "is
a request that Courts of law abdicate their responsibility for the
upkeep of the common law.
this case demonstrates."

That upkeep it needs continuously, as
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corpora-

tion, 525 P.2d 667, 676 (California, 1984).
A.

The common law is the fabric of our society and by

necessity it must change and adapt to the needs of the community

it serves.
Thomas Jefferson, one of our country's greatest scholars
and architects of our country's legal system, stated:
Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes
more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and
manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times. (Jefferson, letter to Samuel Kercheval July 12, 1816)
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Hurtado
v. California, (1884) 110 U.S. 516, 530 stated:
This flexibility and capacity for growth and
adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellance
of the common law (110 U.S. at 530).
However, this vitality can flourish only so long as the
Courts remain alert to their obligation and opportunity to interpret and modify the common law when reason and equity demand it.
As conditions, beliefs and needs of society change, so is change
and adeptation of sound common law principles and rights.
In Rodriguez v. Bethleham Steel Corporation, supra, the
California Supreme Court states:
The judicial responsibility to which we
referred in Pierce arises from the role of the
courts in a common law system. In California as
in other jurisdictions of Anglo-American heritage, the common law "is not a codification of
exact or inflexible rules for human conduct, for
the redress of injuries, or for protection
against wrongs, but is rather the embodiment of
broad and comprehensive unwritten principles,
inspired by natural reason and an innate sense
of justice, and adopted by common consent for
the regulation and government of the affairs of
men".
B.

The common laws recognition of the protected marital

relationship has been longstanding and has adapted to meet needs

of today's society in the concept that marriage is a unique partnership wherein both partners have a protected interest.
It is agreed that early common law developed a protected
right of a husband in the loss of services of his wife. Later
that right developed into the right of the husband to the loss of
the companionship, love and conjugal fellowship of his wife.
Then as married women attained the right to sue, own
property and contract in their own names, Courts have adapted the
right of a husband to loss of consortium to include a right by
both spouses.
In place of the old rule which granted the right to loss
of services only to the husband, a new common law rule has arisen,
recognizes a valid important protected interest that both spouse
have in the marital partnership and which allows each spouse the
right to recover for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury
to the other spouse.
In Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla., 1971) the Florida
Supreme Court held:
So it is that the unity concept of marriage has
in a large part given way to the partner concept
whereby a married woman stands as an equal to
her husband in the eyes of the law. By giving
the wife a separate equal existence, the law
created a new interest which should not be left
unprotected by the Courts. (247 So.2d at 44)
Now in 47 states, District of Columbia, United States
Supreme Court (Maritime Law), and Virgin Islands the common law
has progressed and adapted itself to the needs of a changing
society.

"The law cannot and is not static.

It must keep pace

with changes in our society, for the doctrine of stare decis is

not an iron mold which can never be changed."

Gates v. Foley,

247 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla, 1971).
C.

This Court should recognize the existing common law

of the 47 States and of the United States regarding the unique
nature of the marital relationship and allow both partners to
bring a cause of action if one is injured.
Many difficult decisions come to the Supreme Court but
perhaps none is so difficult as how to deal with older precedent
and the doctrine of stare decis.

In fact, all states which now

recognize the right to loss of consortium had to deal with the
early version of the common law which only allowed the right to the
husband.

In Appendix "A" attached, is a list of at least twenty-

six states which had to review older precedent to finally adopt
the right to loss of consortium to both husband and wife.
However difficult, the law must adapt and change or if
not, it becomes static and outdated.
adaption is not always easy.

The pathway to change and

When the Supreme Court of California

faced this same issue it referred to the landmark case of Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (California, 1968) wherein the Court was faced
with earlier precedent and stated:
"That the courts should allow recovery" to a
wife for losses she personally suffers by reason
of negligent injury to her husband "would appear
to be a compelling proposition." But the pathway to justice is not always smooth. Here, as
in Dillon, the obstacle is a prior decision of
this court; and as in Dillon, the responsibility
for removing that obstacle, if it should be
done, rests squarely upon us. (525 P.2d at 671)
The Supreme Court of California in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, at page 678 quoted Montgomery v. Stephen,

101 NW.2d 227, (1960) when it faced the problem of earlier
precedent:
Were we to rule upon prededent alone, were
stability the only reason for our being, we
would have no trouble with this case. We would
simply tell the woman to begone, and to take her
shattered husband with her, that we need no
longer be affronted by a sight so repulsive. In
so doing we would have vast support from the
dusty books. But dust from the decision would
remain in our mouths through the years ahead, a
reproach to law and conscience alike. Our oath
is to do justice, not to perpetrate error. The
Court rejected the precedents denying recovery
for loss of consortium as "out of harmony with
the conditions of modern society. They do
violence to our convictions and our principles.
We reject their applicability. The reasons for
the old rule no longer obtaining, the rule falls
with it. The obstacles to the wife's action
were judge-invented and they are herewith judgedestroyed". (525 P.2d at 678)
Our Utah Supreme Court has not been backward in
overruling unsound precedent and adapting the common law to fit
the needs of today's society.

Our Court has acted properly in its

role and should not be shackled with old notions of what the right
to loss of consortium meant a centry ago.

When we find that the

common law or "judge-made law" is unjust or out of step with the
times we should have no reluctance to change it.
In Hahn v. Armco Steel, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1979), this
Court adopted strict liability in product liability actions in
expansion or recognition of the developing common law.
In Mulhern v. Ingersoll, 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah, 1980), this
Court adopted pure comparitive negligence in product liability
cases.
In Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1982),
this Court recognized the tort of interference with prospective

economic relations.
The list of cases could go on and on because this Court
has recognized the need to continually adapt and make changes to
the common law.
In Milligan v. Southeastern Elevator Company, 239 NE.2d
897 (NY, 1968), the New York Court of Appeals faced the same issue
and stated:
No recitation of authority is needed to indicate
that this Court has not been backward in overturning unsound precedent in the area of tort
law . . . We act in the finest common law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to
produce common sense justice . . . Legislative
action there could, of course, be, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly
nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an
old and unsatisfactory court-made rule. (239
NE.2d at 903).
In Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyoming, 1986), the
most recent consortium opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court Stated:
We have not hesitated to overrule cases that
were based on what was perceived to be the
common law at the time the decisions were handed
down. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyoming, 666
P.2d 1339 (1974). We are justified in
overruling prior cases grounded on the common
law if they stand for an unfair and improper
rule or have outlived their usefullness, and do
not meet changing needs.
Without this Court recognizing the common law right to
loss of consortium a valid relational interest will go without any
protection and this Court will
injustice.

perpetuate unequality and

Should the State of Utah deny that marriage creates a

viable protectable interest?

Doesn't our society living here in Utah

believe that the marriage relationship should be protected from
outside injury?

At common law, the answer to these questions was

a resounding yes.

Today a marriage needs this protection more than

ever.
This Court should follow the near unanimous adoption of
this view, not because we should jump on a band wagon, but because
the other decisions are well reasoned decisions of other states
and have recognized that the marital interest should be protected
and this is what fits the needs of our present society.
CONCLUSION
Appellant urges the Court to reconsider its opinion as to
the appropriate interpretation of Section 30-2-4 and in particular
hold that its present interpretation is a unconstitutional elimination of a valid common law right and creates an unconstitutional
inequality in its treatment of persons similarly situated.
Appellant also urges the Court to exercise its role as the
common law requires and elevate the law of Utah to the recognition
of the vital common law right of both husband and wife to compensatic
for injuries to the sanctity of the marital relationship.
Appellant thanks the Court for its time and consideration
of this Petition.
DATED this

(p

day of July, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

C RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. £/
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Appellant,
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-4145
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ALABAMA - Swartz v. United States Steet Corp, 293 Ala. 439, 304
So.2d 881 (1974) overruling Smith v. United Construction
Workers, 122 So.2d 153 (I960")
ARIZONA - Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972)
overruling Jeune v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 77 Ariz.
226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954) .
ARKANSAS - Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Miller, 227
Ark. 351, 229 S.W.2d 41 (1957) overruling Federal Court
holding in Jordan v. States Marine Corp., 257 P.2d 232
(CA. 9, 1958X
CALIFORNIA - Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 328 P.2d 449 12
Cal. 3d 382, 115 Ca. Rptr. 765 525 P.2d 669 (1974) overruling Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 50
Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
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CONNECTICUT - Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 408
A.2d 260 (1979) overruling Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Company, 128 A.2d 330 (1956).
DELAWARE - Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717 (1961),
overruling Sofolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 A. 49.
FLORIDA - Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971), overruling
Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla., 1952).
GEORGIA - Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App.
519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953) overruling Gle"nn v. Western U.
Tel. Company, 1 Ga.App. 821, 58 S.E.83.
ILLINOIS - Dini y. Naiditch, 20 111.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)
overruling Patelski v. Snyder, 179 I11.App 24.
INDIANNA - Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969),
overruling, among others, Miller v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App.
148, 189 N.E.2d 720 (1963).
KENTUCKY - Stat. Ann. - Civil Code art. S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970)
overruling Baird v. Cincinati New Orleans & T.P.R. Co.,
(Ky., 1963).
MARYLAND - Deems v. Western Maryland R. Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d
514 (1967), overruling, among others, Nicholson v.
Blanchette, 210 A.2d 732 (1965), supp. op. 213 A.2d 71.
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MASSACHUSETTS - Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514
(1973), overruling, among others, Lombardo v. D.F.
Frangioso & Co., Ins. 269 NE.2d 836 (1971).
MICHIGAN - Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227,
overruling, among others, Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,
151 N.W.2d 724.
MINNESOTA - Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170
N.W.2d 865 (1969), overruling Eschenback v. Benjamin, 263
154 (1935).
MISSOURI - Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.
1963), overruling, among others, Bernhardt v. Perry, 208
S.W. 462.
NEW JERSEY - Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82 215
A. 2d 1 (1965), overruling, among others, Larocca v.
American Claim & Cable Co., 92 A.2d 811, affid 97 A.2d
680 (1952).
NEW YORK - Millington v. South-Eastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d
498, 293 N.Y. S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968),
overruling, among many others, Heller v. Spyrido, 235
N.Y. S.2d 168 (1962) .
NORTH CAROLINA - Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 266
S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980), overruling, among other
conflicting cases, Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 32
S.E.2d 611 (1945).
OHIO -

Clouston v. Remlinger-Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio
St.2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970) is the lead case;
however, Leffler v. Wiley, 239 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio App.
1968) refused to follow an earlier Ohio Supreme Court
case, Smith v. Nicholes Bid. Co., 112 N.E. 204 (1915).

PENNSYLVANIA - Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d (1974),
overruling Newberg v. Bobowicz, 162 A.2d 662 (1960) due
to passage of state ERA.
TEXAS - Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978),
overruling Baldwin v. State, 215 A.2d 492 (1965).
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GREG HACKFORD,
Plaintiff,
SHERRIE HACKFORD,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, and
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC., a
Utah corporation,

Case No. 20208

Defendants-Respondants
and DOES I through X,
Defendants.

Counsel for the Appellant hereby certifies that the
Petition for Rehearing presented herein is made in good faith and
is not for the purposes of any delay.
DATED this
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day of July, 1987.

CV RTCHARD HjENRIKSEN,
of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN" & CALL, P.C,
Attorney for Appellant
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-4145

